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a single macroeconomic policy, currency, and legal framework.3 But this hope for a centrally planned reform has never been embraced outside Moscow, and the new centers of power will be loathe to cede much back to the old center.4 Those interested in assisting in economic reform must address this new reality.
My purpose here is to highlight some of the arguments behind and implications of the necessary evolution of multilateral economic reform efforts, motivated and illustrated by the case of Ukraine. The precise nature of the future economic confederation in the former Soviet Union is far from clear. Anything is possible, from a relatively centralized, although smaller, transformed union to a looser confederation that includes the Baltics and nearly all of Eastern Europe. However, it is clear that the demands for greater autonomy in economic policy cannot be met with yet another reform plan that presumes a strong controlling center.
Problems in Soviet Economic Reform
Most of the well-recognized problems of formerly planned economies are visiting themselves on the component entities of the old Soviet Union. Indeed, compared with the Eastern European countries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, not to mention East Germany, the problems in the Soviet Union are acknowledged to be far more difficult. The memory of political independence and a market economy is far dimmer in the latter, and the wreckage of central planning is at least as pervasive. As Anders Aslund remarked, "The Soviet economic system has been counted out many times before, but never has it appeared so devoid of advantages.
Predictions of a Soviet fiscal crisis have been borne out by events.6 3. For a summary of the main elements of conventional Western proposals for economic reform, with a discussion of the relevance of these recommendations for the new sovereign states, see Nordhaus, Peck, and Richardson in this volume.
4. "But years of suppressed anger over nationality issues, combined with the natural instinct of each republic and city to protect itself against the chaos of the system as a whole, may give such force to separatism that there remains little support for even a loose economic union." Hewett (1990, p. 167).
Aslund (1989, p. 21). 6. Shelton (1989); Aslund (1991).
Current estimates have the 1991 central budget deficit approaching 20 percent of gross national product; official prices have already more than doubled this year, and there are many reports of imminent hyperinflation.7 Of course, the effect of official inflation is confounded in a system with such extensive grey and black markets. However, even prices in these markets have been on the rise, with a recent sale of dollars attracting a bid of 75 rubles per dollar in a currency auction in Tallinn, Estonia, in July 1991 .8 Rapid depreciation of the ruble worries common citizens and foreign investors and reinforces the appearance and reality of economic collapse. The old economic system was organized like a wheel, with the hub in Moscow and communications along the spokes. Despite the skill of Soviet managers, who work around the constraints of the system,9 there is an astonishing lack of information at the enterprise level about suppliers or customers. Without this information, the enterprises are floundering and production is falling. Control by the central ministries has withered and no organized system has been created to take their place. As a result, Gosplan and others have been warning of a fall in output in the state sector in 1991 that will rival the Great Depression in the United States. 10 As the new leaders turn from their political miracle to face their economic misfortune, they must surely agree with Oscar Wilde: "When the gods wish to punish us they answer our prayers. " I I Everyone in the old Soviet Union recognizes the urgent need for economic reform in the direction of freer markets, but there is no agreement on the steps needed to make that move. The problem runs far deeper than just a lack of familiarity with markets and capitalism. The leadership and the population are steeped in a communist ideology and the val- ues that accompany it. The death of the Communist party does not guarantee full burial of its ideals. For instance, notwithstanding the fact that the distribution of income in the Soviet Union already reflects disparities far from the communist ideal,'2 every reform initiative faces criticism if in the end it favors some citizens over others, such as those who work over those who do not. Former Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov's April 1991 "reform" of raising prices, and then wages to compensate for 85 percent of the price increase, 13 was seen in many quarters as necessary, or at least understandable. Given the dire straits of the poorest citizens, whose monthly pensions recently averaged only about 55 rubles,"4 an emphasis on "social protection" permeates evaluations of every specific proposal for revamping the economy. The concern is laudable; the challenge will be to target social protection without distorting the entire economy. 15 The values of communism and central planning will be hard to leave behind. In Ukraine, radical proposals for tax reform in October 1990 contained numerous "administrative" taxes applying to deviations from norms in wages, employment, and production, thereby restoring central planning through tax levies. More recently, reform legislation on foreign economic activity focused so heavily on an onerous division of the economic pie that there seemed little reason to hope that the pie would ever appear. There was no attention to tax holidays or other incentives to stimulate foreign economic activity. These relapses are all part of the same tale. Soviet economic statistics routinely exclude most useful services as unproductive; investment occurs without any provision to recover capital; and brokers ("speculators") are subject to arrest. To Western eyes these policies are anomalies and present serious handicaps for economic reform; to the average Soviet these conditions seem natural. Clearly, underlying Soviet values must be unlearned. This will be no easy task. 
Interdependent Sovereign States
The devolution of power to the individual sovereign states will complicate at least the theory of the economic transition. In addition to the task of developing individual economic reform plans, given little experience and a decades-long brain drain to Moscow ploited each former republic to the benefit of the others. Certainly current domestic prices are so distorted that it is no easy task to untangle the subsidies or to separate the resources that disappeared into the black hole of the central plan.2' It may be that everyone will be immediately better off as they assert their independence, but the best evidence does not support this contention. Unfortunately for the political road ahead, the biggest beneficiary of the new trade arrangements is likely to be Russia. According to estimates of interrepublican trade balances recalculated to world prices from current domestic prices, Russia, with its large supply of hugely underpriced oil, has the most to gain from arm's length trades.22 This fact will not sit well with the many new states that fear Russian hegemony and have a difficult time distinguishing the various governments in Moscow.
In this regard the new sovereign states should heed the experience of Eastern Europe. Every effort should be made to avoid the harmful collapse in trade that occurred between the Soviet Union and its former partners to the west.23 This trade collapse hurt the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, and there is little prospect that a surge in exports for hard currency, such as occurred in Poland, could bail out the economies of the emerging sovereign states of the former Soviet Union.
Economic Reform in Ukraine
Ukraine is the second most populous republic of the former Soviet Union. Home to 52 million people on 233,000 square miles, Ukraine resembles France in population and area. With an educated populace and a wealth of natural resources, especially agricultural and mineral, Ukraine produced just under a fifth of the net output of the Soviet Union.24 Ukraine looks and feels European. It sits across major transportation routes, including virtually all of the natural gas pipelines connecting the Soviet Union to the west. As the most important former republic next to Russia, Ukraine's participation in any confederation of states has been regarded as a key to economic success.25
Already a member of the United Nations, Ukraine has a long history as a nation, especially in the minds of Ukrainians. As a Slavic people, there is a natural connection to Russia and Belorussia, and Ukraine was part of the original formulation of the Soviet Union, an historical fact recently cited by Ukraine's president, Leonid Kravchuk, as an explanation of the difference between Ukraine's more cautious approach to independence and the Baltic states' more clamorous one.26 Of course, the Ukrainians' outrage at their oppression is often interpreted in terms of hostility toward Russia and Russians, which might imply special difficulties for ethnic Russians in Ukraine or for any future cooperation in an economic federation. The Supreme Soviet of Crimea, an autonomous region in Ukraine with a large majority of ethnic Russians, is reportedly considering declaring its own independence. However, evidence suggests that the real hostility focuses on communism, the center, and Moscow. With the Communist party in disarray, the democratic movement's pressure for real independence will only grow. Ukraine will be a sovereign state, and it will take charge of its own economic reform program. Ukrainian laws have been declared supreme on Ukrainian territory, and their supremacy now looks like reality not rhetoric. Ukraine has asserted ownership of all property on its territory. Ukrainian control of its ecology is a priority that cannot be left to the center, which created Chernobyl, the symbol of exploitation.35 Ukraine is now looking to its own currency, fiscal regime, privatization program, defense conversion, and so on. As of yet, there is little concern and less interest in trying to coordinate these policies as part of a larger plan across all republics. The implications are only beginning to unfold. Ukrainians report that Moscow's control of the banks has allowed practices that would cause a revolution anywhere. For example, with no checking accounts or credit cards, Ukraine is highly dependent on the regular use of the 800 million bank notes in circulation.38 Each month the enterprises must queue up at the bank to convert their rubles on account into the paper money needed to pay their workers. However, as a normal practice, release of the cash would be delayed or denied unless the enterprise complied with some disputed directive regarding allocation of production, remission of foreign currency, transfer of accounts, and so on. No wonder that control of the currency and the banking system is repeatedly listed by Ukrainians as the first priority of economic reform. The experiment with Ukrainian coupons in the spring of 1991, designed to prevent the sale of goods to other republics for worthless rubles,39 was also viewed as a first step toward creating a new currency. Although I do not have comparable data for Ukraine, the distribution would be similar. The total Ukrainian privatization program must deal with upwards of 30,000 state enterprises, including perhaps 15,000 enterprises of more than 1,000 employees, and 1,000 enterprises of more than 3,000 employees.45 There has been talk of privatizing 50 percent of these enterprises by the end of 1992. Considering the experience of Poland, East Germany, and the other Eastern European countries, these statistics could easily paralyze. The pressure for rapid privatization is enormous, as this is the promised cure for economic stagnation. Equally compelling is the fear that this pace is practically and politically impossible: many Western analysts has been to applaud the political revolution but to view the expanding economic chaos with dismay. For these highly interdependent economies, a little central design has appeal from afar. Managing many new currencies seems to create multiplicative problems. And the specter of Yugoslavia gives us all pause; it is in everyone' s interest to avoid any expansion or spread of violence among the many ethnic groups scattered across these new states of the old Soviet Union. However, the emerging nation cannot go back to a strong union. Western misgivings may be well founded. "But the fact is that what happens in the Soviet Union is far too important for the West to stand by and watch with no attempt to help the Soviets sift sense from nonsense."95' The West's principal task today must be to mount large-scale programs of technical assistance, on an emergency basis, to help in the sifting. And this effort must now be directed to the new sovereign states.52 Looking on the bright side, with many parallel reform experiments under way, there will be much that one state can learn from another, and the individual mistakes will be somewhat smaller and more contained. The challenge will surely provide all the challenge that one could want in new and unmapped terrains. 
